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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-GEORGIA STATUTE
REQUIRING HOTEL FIRE ESCAPES DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Winecoff Hotel fire in Atlanta resulted in the death of
many guests. The hotel operators were indicted for involuntary
manslaughter for failure to provide outside fire escapes as required
by law. GA. CODE, tit. 52, §§ 201, 205 (1933) imposed this require-
ment upon all hotels of three stories or more in height charging
patrons $2 or more per day. On defendant's demurrer to the in-
dictment, held, the statute is unconstitutional as denying equal
protection of the laws in that the monetary classification is arbi-
trary, bearing no relation to the objective of protecting guests from
fire hazards. Geele v. State, 43 S.E. 2d 254 (Ga. 1947) (one judge
dissenting).
The court majority reached its conclusion upon the familiar
basis that classification must bear some rational relation to the
legislative objective, Southern Railway Co. v. Green, 216 U.S. 400
(1909); Stewart v. Anderson, 140 Ga. 31, 78 S.E. 457 (1913) ,- which
in this case was the safety of hotel patrons. From these premises
they concluded that the exemption of hotels charging guests less
than $2 per day .constituted, as against hotels charging guests a
higher rate, a discrimination amounting to denial of equal protec-
tion.
Where the objective was assumedly one of safety, as in the
case at bar, statutes have been sustained that required all buildings,
excepting residences, of a designated height to be provided with
suitable fire escapes. Arms v. Ayer, 192 fll. 601, 61 N.E. 851 (1901).
Moreover, the courts have sanctioned classifications based upon
differentiation of boarding houses from hotels, lodging houses, and
apartment houses, Huff v. Selber, 10 F. 2d 236 (W.D. La. 1925);
upon the number of floors in a hotel, Rose v. King, 49 Ohio St. 213,
30 N.E. 267 (1892); and upon the number of rooms in a hotel, Miller
v. Strahl, 239 U.S. 426 (1915). But, considering the designated pur-
pose of the statute, a still further classification distinguishing more
expensive hotels from those charging lesser rates appears hardly
tenable in the absence of any evidence of a correlation between
the size of hotels and the rates charged.
If there be a reason for the $2 classification it has not elsewhere
been legislatively recognized, either by neighboring southern states,
FLA. STAT. §§ 511.01, 511.18 (1941); ALA. CODE, tit. 24, § 1, tit. 14,
§ 187 (1940); MISS. CODE § 6999 (1942), or by more industrial states,
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(e.g.) MICH. STAT. §§ 5.2772, 5.3401 (1935) ; OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 843-1,
1002, 1028-1 (1946); N. J. STAT. §§ 29:1-1, 29:1-3 (1937).
,The dissenting justice, approving the classification as reason-
able, regarded the statute not as a safety measure, since there can
be no absolute safety, but rather as a diligence measure, and
reasoned that the greater the compensation received for an act or
service the greater the degree of diligence required. The justice
also declared that the legislature must have intended the attain-
ment of a maximum of diligence without overburdening all of the
hotels to an extent that would necessitate an increase in rates such
as would tend to deny hotel accommodations to people of meagre
means. Although the judge failed to substantiate his reasoning
with decided cases, it would appear that he was on a tack parallel to
that of Mr. Justice Holmes in Keokee Consolidated Coke Co. v.
Taylor, 234 U.S. 224, 227 (1914), wherein the latter declared that
"a statute aimed at what is deemed an evil, and hitting it presum-
ably where experience shows it to be most felt, is not to be upset
by thinking up and enumerating other instances to whfch it might
have been applied equally well, as far as the court can see." The
legislature may proceed cautiously, step by step, and the prohibi-
tion need not be couched in all-embracing terms, Carroll v. Green-
wich Insurance Co., 199 U.S. 401 (1905); Radice v. New York, 264
U.S. 292 (1924), but rather may be limited to instances where detri-
ment is specially experienced. Dominion Hotel v. Arizona, 249 U.S.
265 (1919).
The chapter of the Georgia Code under consideration also re-
quires those hotels charging patrons $2 or more per day to provide
clean bed linens; GA. CODE, tit. 52, §§ 201, 202 (1933); to screen all
openings in the kitchen and dining room; id. §§ 201, 203; and to
keep the closets and toilet rooms in a clean and sanitary condition;
id. §§ 201, 204. From the decision in the principal case it would
seem reasonable to suppose that these remaining provisions of the
chapter would also be declared unconstitutional if ever contested
since the $2 classification would presumably have no more reason-




EQUITY--SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF AUTOMOBILE SALES
CONTRACT
The plaintiff contracted to purchase a new Plymouth club
coupe. The terms were "list price at time of delivery, choice of
color, delivery ... as soon as possible." Down payment of a fifty
dollar deposit was acknowledged. The defendant refused to de-
liver. Held, the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance. De
Moss v. Conart Motor Sales, Inc., 34 Ohio L. R. 535, 72 N.E. 2d
158 (1947).
It is believed that this is the first time, in Ohio or any other
jurisdiction, that specific performance of a contract for the sale
of a new automobile has been granted.
In equity, one requirement for specific performance of a con-
tract for the sale of a chattel is that such chattel be unique or,
if uniqueness be absent, that the remedy at law be inadequate.
The scarcity of a new automobile, at the present time, is so
well recognized that a court would perhaps take judicial notice of
the fact. The courts, however, have held that a chattel is not unique
merely because it is scarce. Kirsh v. Zubalsky, 139 N.J. Eq. 22,
49 A. 2d 773 (1946); cf. Griscom v. Childress, 183 Va. 42, 31 S. E.
2d 309 (1944).
In one area, that of commercial contracts, the courts of equity
have granted specific performance of contracts for the sale of non-
unique chattels. A breach in this area would involve the with-
holding of a scarce item which would necessarily entail losses of a
secondary nature, such as loss of capacity to manufacture or loss
of profits from resale. Secondary losses are to be distinguished from
the primary loss of the chattel itself. Scarcity plus this secondary
business loss seem to give the courts jurisdiction to grant specific
performance on the basis of an inadequate remedy at law. Thus,
where a brewing company, after the passage of the Eighteenth
Amendment but prior to the time the Amendment became effec-
tive, attempted to breach its contract to supply beer to a saloon,
the court decreed specific performance. At that time it was dif-
ficult to obtain quantities of the dwindling stock of beer. Welker
v. The City Brewing Co., 11 Ohio App. 117, 30 Ohio C.C. 445 (1919);
see The 'Equitable Gas Light Co. v. The Baltimore Coal Tar Co.,
63 Md. 285, 300 (1885); cf. Strause v. Berger, 220 Pa. 367 (1908);
Texas Co. v. Central Fuel Oil Co., 194 Fed. 1 (C.C.A. 8th 1912).
The fact that the buyer would be forced to pay a much higher
price upon the market than the contract price is not, of itself, a
sufficient ground for specific performance. See Fox v. Fitzpatrick,
190 N.Y. 259, 266, 82 N.E. 1103, 1106 (1907).
Ohio, along with thirty-one other states, has adopted the Uni-
form Sales Act. Section 68 of the Uniform Sales Act, Ohio General
19481
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Code Section 8448, deals with specific performance of contracts
for the sale of personal property and seems to authorize a wider use
of the remedy. Section 8448 reads as follows: "When the seller has
broken a contract to deliver specific or ascertained goods, a court
having the powers of a court of equity may, if it thinks fit, on the
application of the buyer, by its judgment or decree direct that the
contract shall be specifically performed, without giving the seller
the option of retaining the goods on payment of damages ... "
But the courts in most of the states which have adopted the
Act have construed Section 68 as a mere codification of their exist-
ing state law. Glick v. Beer, 263 App. Div. 1016, 33 N.Y.S." 2d 833
(1942); Outen Grain v. Grace, 239 Ill. App. 284 (1925). In one Ohio
case, the court by way of dictum advocated interpreting Section
8448 "to extend and modify it [equity jurisdiction] where neces-
sary or proper to provide a uniform law of sales that would be
common to all states adopting the same." Hughbanks v. Browning,
9 Ohio App. 114, 115 (1914). The court in the principal case did
not explain its grounds for granting specific performance; how-
ever, since neither uniqueness nor an inadequate remedy at law
was found, this decree may well be based upon Section 8448, fol-
lowing the dictum enunciated in Hughbanks v. Browning, supra.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Court in the principal case, but
only the problem of agency was discussed.
A prerequisite for specific performance, whether authorized
by statute or based on general equitable principles, is certainty in
the terms of the contract. Where a sales contract called for "a new
1947 Studebaker two or four door Champion automobile," a New
York court said that it was for the sale of an unascertained auto-
mobile, and, hence not specifically enforcible by the buyer. Kalinski
v. Grole Motors,_Inc., 69 N.Y.S. 2d 645 (Sup. Ct. 1946); accord, Daub
v. Henry Caplan, Inc., 70 N.Y.S. 2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Goodman
v. Henry Caplan, Inc., 188 Misc. 242, 65 N.Y.S. 2d 576 (Sup. Ct.
1946); Cohen v. Rosenstock Motors, Inc. 188 Misc. 426, 65 N.Y.S.
2d 481 (Sup. Ct. 1946). New York has adopted the Uniform Sales
Act and the unsuccessful attempts to get specific performance in
the above cited cases were based upon Section 68.
The contract in the principal case is more definitive than the
contracts in these New York cases, yet one of its terms is "choice
of color." However, notice the following language of a New York
court, "'One new car... Make Plymouth Type Sedan Year 1946
Color Open,' a description which makes clear that the subject
matter .of the sale was not a specific car identified and agreed upon
at the time the contract to sell was made, but a sale by description
of an unascertained car." Cohen v. Rosenstock Motors, Inc., supra.
If the automobile in the principal case were to be used by a
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traveling salesman or a physician, the result might be rationalized
on the secondary business loss basis. But the inferences drawn
from the facts lead to the conclusion that this automobile was to
be used only for the plaintiff's personal convenience and pleasure.
It is not likely that the general equitable principles governing
specific performance have been extended so far that scarcity alone
either creates uniqueness or renders the remedy at law inadequate.
The result in this case has apparently been reached through 1
broad interpretation of General Code Section 8448, in line with
the dictum of Hughbanks v. Browning, supra.
Donald W. Fisher
EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY-REBUTTABLE BY
BLOOD TEST INVOLVING RH FACTOR
In a proceeding involving the paternity and support of a child
born to a wedded mother, evidence, which showed that the husband
could not be the father of the child due to incompatibility of blood
when tested for the rh factor, was offered by defendant. Under the
conventional ab-mn blood grouping tests the blood of the husband
and the child was compatible. Held, the evidence was admissible
and since it was unchallenged, it established that the husband
was not the father of the child. Saks v. Saks 71 N.Y.S. 2d 797
(Domestic Relations Court of City of New York 1947).
The admissibility and relative weight of blood tests as evidence
have been the subject of many critical articles in legal periodicals.
2 OHIO ST. L. J. 203 (1936), 32 J. CRim. L. 458 (1941), 53 HARV. L.
REV. 285 (1939), 13 U. OF Cn'a. L. REV. 446 (1939), 16 So. CALIF. L.
REV. 177 (1943). But it is believed that this is the first court which
has accepted evidence concerning the much discussed rh factor.
In Ohio, blood tests may be ordered upon the motion of the
defendant in a bastardy proceeding, Ohio General Code Section
12122-1, or by order of the court whenever it shall be relevant in
a civil or criminal action, Ohio General Code Section 12122-2.
Even where the defendant is not in fact the parent, the ab-mn
blood grouping tests will indicate non-paternity in only one-third
of such instances. The findings and result of such blood-grouping
tests admitted in evidence are not conclusive of non-paternity but
may be considered for whatever weight they have to prove the
non-paternity of the putative father. State v. Wright. 59 Ohio App.
191, 17 N.E. 2d 428 (1938), reversed on other grounds, 135 Ohio St.
187, 20 N.E. 2d 229 (1939). It will not support a directed verdict.
State v. Wright, supra. Nor will it support a motion for judgment
1948]
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notwithstanding the verdict or a motion for a new trial. Slovak v.
Holod, Jr., 63 Ohio App. 16, 24 N.E. 2d 428 (1939). Every child be-
gotten in lawful wedlock is in law presumed to be legitimate.
Powell v. State ex rel. Fowler 84 Ohio St. 165, 95 N.E. 660
(1911). Such presumption is not conclusive and may be rebutted by
evidence, which must be clear and convincing, that there was no
sexual connection between husband and wife during the time in
which the child must have been conceived. State ex rel. Walker v.
Clark, 144 Ohio St. 305, 58 N.E. 2d 773 (1944).
In Miller v. Anderson, 43 Ohio St. 473, 3 N.E. 605 (1885), the
husband of a woman pregnant at the time of the marriage ceremony
was conclusively presumed to be the father of the child. In State
ex rel. Walker v. Clark, supra, the plaintiff became pregnant during
a marriage to X which terminated in divorce. In bastardy proceed-
ings against Y she submitted blood tests eliminating X. It was held
that the evidence was admissible, though not conclusive. New York,
under a similar statute and analogous previous decisions, held in
Schulze v. Schulze, 35 N.Y.S. 2d 218 (1942) that the results of the
blood tests plus the husband's statement that there had been no
intercourse with the wife during the period in which the child
must have been conceived was enough to overcome the presump-
tion of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock.
Dr. Alexander S. Wiener testified in the instant case that the
use of the rh factor will make possible the exclusion of the putative
father in almost 55% of the situations where he is in fact not the
parent, in contrast to the exclusion of approximately one-third
of putative fathers under the ab-mn blood-grouping tests. Thus,
while it is still possible for a promiscuous woman through the
natural sympathy -aroused in a jury to attribute the paternity of
her child to one who is in fact not the father, since the blood tests
are not held to be conclusive evidence, the blood tests will be




The Village of Wyoming, Ohio, a municipal corporation, built
a pistol and rifle target range within the corporate limits of the
village on land devoted to a public purpose. These grounds were
open to the use of the general public, and the target range was
used by children with the knowledge of village policemen. One
child was wounded by a shot from the rifle of another child, while
both were on the target range. Held, the municipal corporation is
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liable to the parent for expenses and to the injured, minor plaintiff
for damages on the ground of a nuisance created and maintained
by the village. Gaines v. Village of Wyoming, and Gaines, Jr. v.
Village of Wyoming (two cases), 147 Ohio St. 491, 72 N.E. 2d 369
(1947).
Ohio General Code Section 3714 provides that municipal cor-
porations shall keep public grounds free from nuisance. This pro-
vision is in derogation of the common law, but such provision does
not by implication impose liability for negligence not involving
nuisance. Selden v. Cuyahoga Falls, 132 Ohio St. 223, 6 N.E. 2d 976
(1937).
Traditionally, liability of a municipal corporation for negligence
of its servants or agents has been limited to cases in which the
negligence occurred in the performance of proprietary functions;
there was immunity in the area of governmental functions. Aldrich
v. City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922). For
examples of immunity see 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations
§§ 2591, 2593 (Rev. 2d ed. 1937). But there has been liability for
nuisance, without any governmental-proprietary distinction. 43
C.J. 956, § 1734 (1927). For background and criticism see Prof.
Borchard's articles, "Government Liability in Tort," 34 Yale L.J. 1,
129, 229 (1924-25), 36 Yale L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-27).
Counsel for the village in the principal case contended that the
construction and maintenance of a target range could not create,
per se, an absolute nuisance, -and further that only the failure of
the police department to prevent shooting by children could pro-
duce a nuisance in these circumstances, and that municipal cor-
porations are immune from liability for negligence in the perform-
ance of governmental functions. The village prevailed in the Court
of Appeals. 77 Ohio App. 373, 66 N.E. 2d 162 (1946).
The argument of the defendant village was met in a recent
Pennsylvania case, cited with approval in the principal case. The
facts were similar. There the court said that the breach of duty
was not a failure properly to police, but rather a failure in a pro-
prietary capacity to abate a dangerous condition existing on its
property. And this is true, said the court, even though it could be
abated only by the exercise of a governmental power by city
police, wherein they failed. Stevens v. Pittsburgh, 329 Pa. 496, 198
Atl. 655 (1938), affirming the opinion of Superior Court, 129 Pa.
Sup. 5, 194 Atl. 563 (1936). The Gaines case holds the village liable
"... even though in the proper exercise of police power such viola-
tion should have been suppressed or offenders apprehended and
punished." Supra, Syllabus 2, page 491.
Thus it appears in these cases that negligence in the area of
governmental functions may create the basis of liability when, as
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here, that negligence is a sine qua non of a nuisance. Query: do
these cases manifest an attempt to avoid the immunity rule, while
maintaining it in form?
Cases which seem to circumvent the rule of immunity by
putting liability on the ground of nuisance are not uncommon. Pris-
oners escaping from a workhouse so terrorized and annoyed the
plaintiff in adjacent property that the municipality was liable in
damages for a nuisance. District of Columbia v. Totten, 5 F. 2d 374
(App. D.C. 1925). Operating under a city building permit, a build-
ing contractor obstructed unreasonably a city street. When the city
failed to take action, held (on demurrer), city liable with the con-
tractor for nuisance. George Washington Inn, Inc. v. Consolidated
Engineering Co., 75 F. 2d 657 (App. D.C. 1935). A city failed
adequately to block or to secure corrugated pipe piled in a public
park. A child was killed when other children caused sections of
the pipe to roll about. Held, city liable on ground of nuisance.
Gottesman, Adm'r. v. City of Cleveland, 142 Ohio St. 410, 52 N.E. 2d
644 (1944). The plaintiff was injured by water when a fire hose
was improperly connected at the hydrant, while firemen were
actually engaged in fighting a fire. Held, a nuisance; city liable.
Swindal v. City of Jacksonville, 119 Fla. 338, 161 So. 383 (1935).
These are considered judicial expressions of dissatisfaction with the
rule of immunity.
The Ohio court has considered the nuisance cases as attacks
upon the citadel of governmental immunity. Of the statute which
requires a municipal corporation to keep streets and public grounds
free from nuisance, Ohio General Code Section 3714, the court has
said that the duty there imposed "is an exception to the rule of
common law that no liability attaches to a municipality for negli-
gence in the discharge of a governmental function." City of Ham-
ilton v. Dilley, 120 Ohio St. 127, 165 N.E. 713 (1929).
In 1919, the Ohio court abandoned the governmental-proprie-
tary formula, holding a city liable under respondeat superior for
the negligence of a fireman, who was driving a fire truck at the time
of an accident. Fowler, Adm'x. v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St.
158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919). But this assault was perhaps too bold, and
the case was expressly overruled in another collision case, this time
involving a police patrol wagon, negligently operated. Aldrich v.
City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922).
It is believed that the result in the principal case is a whole-
some one, but also that the law should be settled. The nuisance
cases seem to sabotage clarity in the law, of which there is a paucity
in this area.
It is submitted that change by legislation is more desirable.
See Fordham and Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in
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Tort in Louisiana, 3 LA. L. REV. 720 (1941). The Federal Govern-
ment has furnished an example in the Federal Tort Claims Act,
60 STAT. 843, 28 U.S.C.A. §§921-946 (Supp. 1946). Ohio has taken
one step. Ohio General Code Section 3714-1 removed the immunity
in negligence cases involving the use of motor vehicles in govern-
mental functions other than police and fire protection.
Charles W. Davidson, Jr.
TAXATION-REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF
MUNICIPAL TRANSIT SYSTEM NOT EXEmPT-NOT
USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE
The city of Shaker Heights owns and operates the transit sys-
tem between that city and Cleveland. In June, 1945, the city filed
an application for exemption from taxation for the tax year 1945.
The exemption was claimed for all real and personal property of
the transit system upon the ground that it was public property
used for a public purpose within the meaning of Ohio General
Code Section 5351. Held, that both the real and personal property
of the transit system were taxable. City of Shaker Heights v.
Zangerle, Auditor, 148 Ohio St. 361, 74 N.E. 2d 318 (1947).
The court relied upon the case of Zangerle, Auditor v. City of
Cleveland, 145 Ohio St. 347, 61 N.E. 2d 720 (1945). In that case the
court argued that property of the. transit system was not public
property used -exclusively for a public purpose because a transit
system is a business operated primarily for profit. Since the Ohio
Constitution, Article XII, Section 2, reads, ". . .General laws may
be passed to exempt public property used exclusively for a public
purpose,", it follows that the General Assembly has -no power to
exempt property not so used. It has been decided that Article XII,
Section 2, applies only to real property and not to personal prop-
erty. State ex rel. Struble v. Davis, 132 Ohio St. 555, 9 N.E. 2d
684 (1937). Therefore, the court in the principal case could have
upheld exemption of the personal property, even though the legis-
lature lacked power to exempt the real property. However, the
court declined to sustain exemption of either class of property.
Ohio General Code Section 5351, reads, "public property used for
a public purpose shall be exempt from taxation," and the court
thought that the personal property of the transit system did not fall
within the statute.
This case assumes particular importance in view of previous de-
cisions of the same court. In 1896, a municipal gas works was held
exempt from taxation and the court. said that the statute which per-
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mitted the exemption, Section 2732, Revised Statutes, (now Ohio
General Code Section 5367), did not violate Article XII of the
constitution because the property was used exclusively for a public
purpose. Toledo v. Hosler, Treasurer, 54 Ohio St. 418, 43 N.E. 583
(1896). Since private homes and businesses were furnished with
gas from the municipal gas plant, it appears that the court construed
the phrase, "exclusively for a public purpose," to mean, "substan-
tially all, or for the greater part used for a public purpose." This
view is affirmed by Toledo v. Jenkins, 143 Ohio St. 141, 54 N.E. 2d
656 (1944).
It was necessary, in order to justify exemption from taxation,
that the real property of the transit system in the principal case be
used exclusively for a public purpose. Otherwise, Article XII, Sec-
tion 2, would have been contravened. The court said that the use
of the property was not exclusively public. But it would seem that
the use of the property for furnishing gas to both public and private
outlets should, by the same criterion, have been held not an ex-
clusively public use. The court stated that operating a transit sy-
stem is a proprietary and not a governmental function. According
to the court, an activity is proprietary if it involves a business
usually operated for profit. There is some doubt, however, whether
a transit system is a business usually operated primarily for profit
while a gas plant is not.
This distinction between proprietary and governmental func-
tions drawn by the court should not have altered the decision in
the principal case. The court was dealing with a constitutional pro-
vision. The provision states, "public property used exclusively for
a public purpose shall be exempt" (italics supplied). This language
makes no distinction between activities which are governmental
and those which are proprietary. Since no differentiation is made,
it would seem to be irrelevant that the activity can be classed as
proprietary because it is making a profit. The constitution requires
only that the use be public; if it be a public use then the question
of profit does not affect the corfstitutionality of the exemption.
The principal case then, does not seem to be reconcilable with
the earlier decisions, although the earlier decisions are not ex-
pressly overruled. It has cast some doubt on the constitutionality
of Ohio General Code Section 5367, which exempts municipally
owned gas and water works from taxation. If rthe court meant to
overrule Toledo v. Hosler, supra, then Section 5367 would be un-
constitutional because it gives exemption to property not used ex-
clusively for a public purpose. If it did not, then we must find a
substantial difference between the municipal operation of gas works
and the municipal operation of transit systems.
An examination of the constitutions of the other states reveals
[Vol. 9
RECENT DECISIONS
that in fifteen states the exemption of municipal property is not
covered. In eighteen states all municipally owned property is
exempt, while in only nine states, (Ark., Fla., Kan., Ky., Minn.,
Ohio, Pa., Tenn., Tex.), do the constitutions provide that the prop-
erty used exclusively for a public purpose is exempt.
There have been many cases involving the exemption of mu-
nicipal utilities from taxation in these nine states. Waterworks
have generally been held exempt, City of Harlan v. Blair, 251 Ky.
51, 64 S.W. 2d 434 (1933); City of Abilene v. State, 113 S.W. 2d 631
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Anoka Co. v. City of St. Paul, 194 Minn. 554,
261 N.W. 588, 99 A.L.R. 1137 (1935); City 'of Easton v. Koch, 152 Pa.
Super. 327, 31 A. 2d 747 (1944), but not, according to two states, that
part of the waterworks supplying water to other districts. City of
Knoxville v. Park City, 130 Tenn. 626, 172 S.W. 286 (1914); City
of Covington v. Commonwealth, 107 Ky. 680, 39 S.W. 836 (1897).
Municipal light plants have been held exempt, Saunders v. City of
Jacksonville, 157 Fla. 240, 25 So. 2d 648 (1946); A. & M. Cons. School
District v. City of Bryan, 143 Tex. 348, 184 S.W. 2d 914 (1945) ; State
ex rel. Becker v. Smith, 144 Kan. 570, 61 P. 2d 898 (1936), but there
has been a split on the question of public housing. Ohio will not
exempt it, Colurthbus Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Thatcher,
140 Ohio St. 38, 42 N.E. 2d 437 (1943), while Florida will. Statle
ex rel. Burbridge v. St. John, 143 Fla. 876, 197 So. 549 (1941).
It can be seen that there is a marked similarity in the holdings of
the courts of these nine states. Ohio is apparently the first to decide
the question of tax exemption for municipal transit systems. It will
be interesting to see whether the other states arrive at the same
conclusion.
Richard 0. Gantz
TORTS--DEFAMATION BROADCAST BY RADIO-LIBEL OR
SLANDER
Defendant broadcast defamatory remarks by reading from a
script into a radio microphone. Held, defamatory remarks pub-
lished in such a manner is libel and not slander. Hartman v. Win-
chell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E. 2d 30 (1947).
This case raises an important problem because here no special
damages were alleged, nor were the words concerning the plaintiff
slanderous per se since they did not defame his professional char-
acter. Libel is usually held to be actionable per se and proof of
special damages is unnecessary; but slander is, except in special
cases, actionable only on proof of actual damage. These differences
between libel and slander are -the result of the historical origins
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of the two actions. The rules relating to slander derive from the
common law action on the case, the rules relating to libel, from
criminal proceedings in the Star Chambei. SALMOND, ToRTs 371
(10th ed. 1945).
In distinguishing libel from slander the rule has been stated
that false defamatory words, if spoken, constitute a slander; if
written and published, a libel. This method of differentia has also
been expressed in another manner, that libel comes to the eyes,
slander to the ears. Most cases recognize these distinctions as being
too general and declare other differentia to be decisive. In Ostrowe
v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 175 N.E. 505 (1931) it was held that in libel the
defamatory matter is in some permanent form, while in slander
it is conveyed by some transient method of expression. Another
court stated the underlying distinction was the extent of the diffu-
sion of the defamatory matter. Thorley v. Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 128
Eng. Rep. 367, 371 (1812). One writer is of the opinion that the
present tendency is to make the distinction on the basis of the
potentiality of harm. PROSSER, ToRTs 793. The Restatement of Torts
§568 (3), suggests that in new and novel situations the deciding fac-
tors in each case should be the area of dissemination, the deliberate
and premeditated character of its publication, and the persistence
of the defamatory conduct.
The instant case seems to be in accord with the slight majority
of the jurisdictions in holding the method of publishing defamatory
remarks as a libel. The rationale of the decision is based upon an
analogy to cases that have held the reading of a defamatory let-
ter in the presence of others to be a sufficient publication to sus-
tain an action for libel. De Libellis Faraosis, 5 Coke's Rep. 125, 77
Eng. Rp. 250 (1610); Snyder v. Andrews, 6 Barb. 43 (1849); For-
rester v. Tyrrell, 9 Times L. R. 257 (1893). This distinction has
been criticized on the ground that the radio listener does not know
whether the matter he hears is read or impromptu and if the lat-
ter then the analogy of reading matter aloud from a paper would
not apply. Davis, "Libel and Slander by Radio," 34 Case and Com-
ment 67. Other jurisdictions have placed their decisions of libel
upon the ground that there is a close analogy between words
spoken over a radio and libelous words contained in a newspaper.
Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82, A.L.R. 1098 (1932);
Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Missouri
1934).
In Meidrum v. Australian Broadcasting Co. Ltd., (1932) V.L.R.
425, an Australian court dealt with the problem and decided def-
initely that defamatory material broadcast over the radio is slan-
der, whether read from a script or not, because the publication is
by word -of mouth. Although Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299
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N.Y. Supp. 188 (1937) was a case of an impromptu interpolation
the court felt that it was not within their province to eradicate
the long established distinction between libel -and slander. "Libel,"
said the court, "has always been considered as written, and slan-
der as spoken, defamation." Locke v. Gibbons, supra, at 880, 299
N.Y. Supp. at 192. Any change, the court suggested, should be ac-
complished by appropriate legislation.
In some states the problem has been settled by legislation,
but the statutes are not in accord. In Oregon (Laws 1931, c. 366,
p. 681) -and Washington (Laws 1935, c. 117, p. 329), defamation
over the radio has been defined as libelous; while in California
(Stats. 1929, c. 682, p. 1174), Illinois (Smith-Hurd Ill. Stats. c. 126,
§§4-6), and North Dakota (Laws 1929, c. 117) radio defamation is
declared to be slander.
The court in the instant case did not determine what the basis
of liability would have been had the defamatory matter been
spoken extemporaneously. Field, 3., in a concurring opinion stated
that even extemporaneous remarks made over a radio should be
libel because of the harm inherent in radio broadcasting with its
potentially vast area of dissemination. If the permanency of form
were used as the criterion of distinction, on this problem of im-
promptu remarks, then the courts could easily conclude that such
a publication results only in a slander. Also, jurisdictions which
recognize only written defamation as constituting a libel would
hold such a publication to be slander. However, if the area of
dissemination or the potentiality of harm should be decisive in
the differentia, then the courts might hold that extemporaneous
radio remarks constitute a libel. If it be conceded that the tort
of libel was created to meet" the greater damage caused by the
wider dissemination of the printed word over the spoken word,
then (since the area of service for some radio stations far exceeds
that of many newspapers) it would seem that there could be no
satisfactory logic to support the assignment" of a lesser remedy.
than libel to radio defamation.
Charles Deitle
TRUSTS-CHARITABLE TRUST-CY PasS DocTRIN-
DocTmN OF DEVIATION
Testatrix left her entire estate to establish a "strictly private
home" for full orphans of the United Lutheran Church of Miami
County. Several provisions in the will seemed to point to the fact
that the testatrix definitely contemplated that the house she had
lived in should be used as an orphan's home. It was admitted that
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it was impracticable and inexpedient to carry out the specific terms
of the trust, and the question is should the corpus of the trust be
paid over to a Home near Springfield which is supported by the
United Lutheran Church and admits children from Ohio and five
other states? Held, the doctrine of cy pres could not be applied to
this case because there was no general charitable intent to aid or-
phans, but by the doctrine of deviation from the terms of the
trust the court required the trustees to expend the trust funds for
the care, maintenance and support of Miami County orphans dur-
ing their residence at the Home near Springfield. Craft v. Shroyer,
74 N.E. 2d 589 (Ohio App. 1947).
When, in the case -of a charitable trust, it becomes impossible
or impractical to carry out the testator's purpose, there is a
question of whether the trust fails or whether the trust funds are
to be applied to a similar charitable purpose. "The principle un-
der which the courts attempt to save a charitable trust from failure
by carrying out the more general purpose of the testator and
carrying out approximately though not exactly his more specific
intent is called the doctrine of cy pres." SCOTT TRuSTS, §399. The
theory underlying the application of the doctrine of cy pres is that
the court is carrying out the general intent of the testator. Craft
v. Shroyer, supra.
In Allen, Admr. v. City of Bellefontaine, 47 Ohio App. 359, 191
N.E. 896 (1934), the testatrix had left her home to the city for
the exclusive use of reputable physicians and surgeons of Belle-
fontaine and Logan County. The house was to be used as a place
to conduct meetings, carry on research, and as a private hospital.
It became inexpedient to carry out the terms of the trust and the
court held that the trust failed. The cy pres doctrine was not ap-
plied because the testatrix indicated no general charitable intent.
In another case where the testatrix left the residue of her real
and personal estate for the purpose of establishing a home for
deaf children on her estate, and it later became impracticable to
carry out the trust, the court applied the cy pres doctrine and di-
rected that the property be delivered to an already-established
home for the deaf. Ely v. Malone, Atty. Gen., 202 Mass. 545, 89 N.E.
166 (1909). Apparently the Allen decision was based on the fact
that the testatrix desired to benefit the doctors but only according
to a specific plan. She wanted her home set up as a memorial to
her late husband. In the Ely case, on the other hand, the court felt
that the testatrix intended to benefit deaf children in any event
and not merely if it were practicable to establish a home on her
estate.
"A great exactness and strictness of construction is the rule
in private trusts, while liberality and a broad general application
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of the principles of equity are called in vogue in construing a will
creating a charitable trust." Gearhart v. Richardson, 109 Ohio St.
418, 436, 142 N.E. 890, 895 (1924). It would seem that the court
in -the principal case was not so liberal when it held that cy pres
would not save the trust. However, the finding that there was no
general charitable intent precluded the application of the cy pres
doctrine. Alien, Admr. v. City of Bellefontaine, supra.
The court may direct or permit the trustee of a charitable trust
to deviate from the terms of a trust to accomplish the purposes
of the trust. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, §381. Deviation, however, will
only be permitted to .prevent failure of the purpose of a charitable
trust. Findley v. Conneaut, 145 Ohio St. 480, 62 N.E. 2d 318 (1945).
A charitable trust capable of being enforced will not be terminated
because of the necessity for a small administrative change which
does not alter the purpose or object of the trust. Gearhart v. Rich-
ardson, supra. On the basis of cases involving charitable trusts
which have been decided in the past, it is possible that in a fact
situation like that of the principal case, many courts would have
allowed the trust to fail when the finding of no general charitable
intent precluded the application of the cy pres doctrine. However,
in the principal case the court permitted a deviation from the
-terms of a trust to prevent its failure, Findley v. Conneaut, supra,
and directed the trustees to expend the trust funds for the
care of the orphans living in an already-established home.
Thus by the application of the doctrine of deviation the trust
was sustained and the orphans benefited in a case where
the court could not apply the cy. pres doctrine to carry out
the intent of the testatrix. The instant case can be differentiated
from the Union Savings Bank and Trust Co. v. Alter, 103 Ohio St.
188, 132 N.E. 834 (1921) where the court refused to permit devia-
tion from the terms of the trust. The basis of the distinction is that
the principal case involved a charitable trust while the Alter case
involved a private trust. Chief Justice Marshall, dissenting in the
Alter case, supra at 216, 132 N.E. at 842, thought that the majority's
decision reached a result, "unfortunate 'indeed if it is -to become
settled law of Ohio that trust estates are to be administered ac-
cording to their strict letter, and no deviation is to be permitted
even in cases where it is admitted that exigencies have arisen
which are likely to be destructive of the very purpose of the trust."
A. J. Conkle
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-COURSE OF AND ARISING OUT OF
EMPLOYMENT A DUAL REQUIREMENT
The plaintiff, an inside employee of the defendant company,
rode to work daily with a fellow employee, the car being custom-
arily left on a company-owned parking lot near the plant. On one
occasion, the plaintiff fell on the snow and ice covering the lot, was
injured, and sought compensation. The Industrial Commission
denied the claim; Common Pleas Court, on appeal, granted com-
pensation; and Court of Appeals affirmed. Held, reversed. The
injury was not incurred, "in the course of and arising out of the
employment." Walborn v. General Fireproofing Co., 147 Ohio St.
507, 72 N.E. 2d 95 (1947).
Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 35 provides, "compensa-
tion.. .for injuries. . occasioned in course of employment." Ohio
General Code Section 1465-68, provides, "Employee... injured... in
course of employment.. .shall be entitled... to compensation. 'In-
jury' as used in this section.. .shall include any injury received in
the course of, and arising out of the employment." Ohio Laws 1937,
117 v. 109, in defining "injury", incorporated for the first time in
statutory form the requirement that a compensable injury must
arise out of the employment as well as be incurred in the course
of employment.
Originally, Ohio's statute and constitution required only that
the injury be incurred in course of employment; however, the
courts early read into the statute the requirement of "arising out
of." "It was... the intention of the framers of the amendment, and
of the statute, to provide for compensation only to one whose injury
was the result of or connected with the employment." Fassig v.
State, 95 Ohio St. 232, 247, 116 N.E. 104, 108 (1917). "The test.. .is
whether the employment had some causal connection with the
injury." Ind. Comm. v. Weigandt, 102 Ohio St. 1, 130 N.E. 38 (1921).
It is clear in Ohio by settled judicial determination and now by
legislative enactment that an injury to be compensable must meet
this dual requirement: first, the employee at the time of his injury
must be in the course of his employment; and second, the injury
must arise out of the employment.
While it is obvious that an employee is not in the course of
employment before he leaves home for work, courts have felt that
there is some indefinite point prior to entering the employer's
premises at which the employee should be considered in the course
of employment for purposes of compensation. This nebulous area
is termed "zone of employment." In Ohio it is not clear what isf
meant when the courts use zone; but it includes, at least, any area
subject to the employer's control, even though such area is outside
the enclosure of the employer, if the employee has no option but
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to pursue a given course when entering or leaving his employer's
premises. Ind. Comm. v. Barber, 117 Ohio St. 373, 159 N.E. 363
(1927). The facts there involved an injury on a public street which
terminated in a dead end at the plant entrance. Since this street was
the only means of ingress and egress maintained by the employer,
the employee was considered to be within the zone subject to the
employer's control. But see, Fike v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
56 Ohio App. 197, 9 Ohio Op. 312, 10 N.E. 2d 242 (1937). For a dis-
cussion of "zone" cases, see note, 5 Omo ST. L.J. 139 (1938).
An injury arises out of the employment when there is a causal
connection between the employment -and the injury. Ind. Comm. v.
Weigandt, supra. The employment must be responsible in some
way for the injury. The causative danger must be peculiar to the
employment and not common to the neighborhood. Mobile and
0. R. R. v. Ind. Comm. of Ill., 28 F. 2d 228 (E.D. Cal. 1928). Thus,
a delivery man admittedly in the course of his employment while
driving on a public highway was injured when a tornado felled a
telephone pole which landed on top of his automobile. The court
held that the injury did not arise from the employment, because
the employment subjected him to no greater danger of such an
injury than the general public in using the highway. Slanina v.
Ind. Comm., 117 Ohio St. 329, 158 N.E. 829 (1927). But a worker
employed in the woods during the hunting season, who is acci-
dentally shot by a hunter, is entitled to compensation since his
employment reasonably increases the danger of such an injury.
0. L. Shafter Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 175 Cal. 522, 166 Pac. 24 (1917).
In the principal case, plaintiff contended that the only pre-
requisite for recovery of compensation was to show that he was in
the zone of his employment when injured. This was clearly in-
correct and the Supreme Court so held. An employee enters upon
his employment upon reaching the zone under his employer's con-
trol, but he is entitled to compensation only if there is a causal
connection between his injury and the employment. Ind. Comm. v.
Barber, supra. The Supreme Court in the principal case said,
"Clearly the plaintiff did not suffer an injury in the course of and
arising out of his employment." As has been seen, an employee
within the zone subject to the employer's control is considered, in
Ohio, to be in the course of employment. Ind. Comm. v. Barber,
supra. The court took no notice of the distinction between "course
of" and "arising out of" the employment, and should have held that
plaintiff was in the course of his employment. However, even
though the injury occurred in the course of employment, it has
already been seen that to receive compensation, plaintiff must also
establish some causal relation between the employment and the
injury. The entire city was covered with snow, and the public at
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large was subject to the same danger of slipping and falling.
Plaintiff was an inside employee, so the employment in no way
increased the hazard of falling; therefore, the injury did not arise
out of the employment, and on this ground, rather than the dual
reason given by the court, it would seem that the plaintiff is not
entitled to receive compensation.
William B. Devaney
